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Abstract 
Search behavior is fundamental for adapting to the environment across species and one 
important aspect in search is making the appropriate tradeoff between exploration and 
exploitation. We intended to replicate findings of carry-over effects of exploratory and 
exploitative search strategies between different search domains (Hills, Todd, & Goldstone, 
2008, 2010). Participants performed a visual search task in which they foraged for food 
tokens in either a diffuse or a clustered visual scene which should elicit exploratory and 
exploitative search strategies, respectively. We expected to see carry-over effects of these 
strategies in cognitive search in a subsequent scrabble task. Additionally, we used eye blink 
rate (EBR) to study the hypothesized neuromodulatory influence of striatal dopamine on 
exploration and exploitation in search. Contrary to our expectations, we found that 
participants who foraged a diffuse visual scene, showed more exploitative search behavior in 
the scrabble task compared to participants who foraged a clustered visual scene. The 
measurement of EBR might have primed all participants to take on an exploitative search 
strategy, precluding replication of Hills et al.’s findings, but carry-over effects of the search 
strategy are still apparent. We also found that the amount of exploration and exploitation was 
not related to EBR. The consideration of different dopaminergic systems in the control of 
exploratory and exploitative behavior might be important for future research into the role of 
dopamine in cognitive control. To comprehensively study dopamine in search behavior future 
research should include not only EBR but also a measure of prefrontal dopamine. 
Running head: SEARCH IN DIFFERENT COGNITIVE DOMAINS AND DOPAMINE  3 
Introduction 
Animals and humans spend ample time searching for resources. Consider the simple 
example of an animal foraging for fruits or a person shopping for groceries. Search can also 
be internal; for example, you may perform a cognitive search for the right words to say (Hills 
& Dukas, 2012). Search behavior is fundamental for adapting to the environment across 
species and has accordingly been the subject of much research (e.g., Hills, 2006; Hills & 
Dukas. 2012, Nikitin & Hills, 2016). Although hard to define, there is some agreement that 
search involves (a) the presence of a goal, (b) some uncertainty about the environment, (c) a 
way to sample the environment, and (d) a stopping rule (Hutchinson et al., 2012). The 
question of how an animal or human decides to persist in search or stop searching is 
dependent on making an appropriate tradeoff between exploration and exploitation (Mehlhorn 
et al., 2015; Todd, Hills, & Robbins, 2012). In cognitive search, someone naming as many 
animals as he knows is exploiting a source of animals by naming all farm animals that come 
to mind. When he runs out of farm animals to name he might make an exploratory move and 
start naming animals of a different type like pets. In visual search someone samples a visual 
scene, for example in a Where is Waldo book. Each time someone focuses on a particular 
group of people, or an area in the scene where there are many red-and-white-striped objects, 
she could be said to exploit that part of the scene until she decides to look for Waldo 
elsewhere. When she looks for a better place to find him, she explores the entire scene to 
exploit that new place until she finds Waldo.  
This study is concerned with exploratory and exploitative behavior in human search 
behavior. We consider the idea that mechanisms in animal foraging behavior might have 
evolved to cognitive control mechanisms that control several cognitive processes in humans, 
among which cognitive search (Hills, 2006; Hills, Todd, & Goldstone, 2008, 2010). 
According to this idea we expected we could elicit either an exploratory or exploitative 
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cognitive style with a visual foraging task to prime exploratory or exploitative cognitive 
control in a cognitive search task. This would indicate that there can be carry-over effects of 
cognitive control style between tasks in different search domains. We also expected 
neuromodulatory involvement of dopamine (DA) in exploitation and exploration in human 
search similar to that observed in animal behavior (Hills et al., 2008, 2010). In support of both 
ideas we aimed to provide evidence of shared physiological mechanisms between a certain 
type of foraging behavior—area restricted search—and cognitive search.  
 
Search behavior: area restricted search 
Area-restricted search (ARS) is a search strategy that is used by a wide variety of 
animals (including humans; Kalff, Hills, & Wiener, 2010; Hills, 2006). Animals that use ARS 
will increase their turning frequency when they find food. This restricts their search to the 
area where they encountered the resource until some time has passed since the last food 
encounter (Hills, 2006; Kalff et al., 2010). Because resources are often found in patches in 
biological environments, this behavior is often optimal for foraging animals (Hills, 2006; 
Kalff et al., 2010). As ARS has been observed throughout a wide range of animal species 
including humans, it might be an evolutionary precursor to human goal-directed behavior, 
including goal-directed cognitive search (Hills, 2006; Kalff et al., 2010).  
 
Evidence of a shared evolutionary mechanism: carry-over effects 
If the same mechanism that underlies ARS has evolved into a mechanism that 
modulates cognitive control in humans, one expectation would be that cognitive control 
should be domain-general. In other words, it should affect external as well as internal search 
behavior in humans. Indeed, studies show that cognitive control effects can carry over 
between different types of search (Hills et al., 2008, 2010). In these studies participants 
Running head: SEARCH IN DIFFERENT COGNITIVE DOMAINS AND DOPAMINE  5 
foraged a visual scene for food tokens that were distributed in either a clustered or a diffuse 
manner. In a consecutive scrabble task, in which participants had to do a cognitive search for 
anagrams in a set of letters, participants who foraged in the clustered visual scene tended to 
spend more time searching for words within each letter set compared to those who searched 
the diffuse scene. The visual foraging task thus seemed to prime an exploitative or exploratory 
cognitive style that transferred to a task in another search domain (Hills et al., 2008, 2010).  
Carry-over effects are also observed in other studies that prime either flexible or 
persistent cognitive control. One study found that open monitoring meditation, a type of 
meditation that promotes an unfocused awareness, increases performance on the Alternate 
Uses Task, a fluency task that benefits from flexible or exploratory thinking (Colzato, Ozturk, 
& Hommel, 2012; Guilford, 1967). Another study showed that priming participants' cognitive 
control with the Remote Associates Task (RAT), a task that requires more exploitative or 
persistent cognitive control, helped them to focus on a primary task in a dual-task paradigm 
(Fischer & Hommel, 2012; Mednick, 1962). These findings indicate that exploratory and 
exploitative cognitive styles can carry over between tasks. This also supports the idea of one 
cognitive control system and thus a common evolutionary basis for control of different types 
of search tasks (Hills et al., 2008, 2010; Hommel, 2012).  
 
Evidence of a shared evolutionary mechanism: dopamine 
If the mechanism underlying cognitive search evolved from early foraging behavior 
we would expect that they share a similar physiological system. In ARS, the increase in 
turning frequency upon encountering food appears to be modulated by DA (Hills, 2006). For 
example, exogenous application of DA dramatically increases turning frequency in C. elegans 
and DA antagonists can block ARS (Hills, Brockie, & Maricq, 2004). Two regions in the 
human brain that are involved in search behavior are the basal ganglia – in particular the 
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striatum – and the prefrontal cortex (PFC; Frank, Doll, Oas-Terpstra, & Moreno, 2009; Hills, 
2006; Maia & Frank, 2011). Dopaminergic receptors and projections are abundant in both the 
basal ganglia and PFC and there are strong reciprocal connections between them (Cools, 
2015).  
Over evolution, the basal ganglia have expanded considerably in humans, and this 
might have facilitated the coding of more complex relationships between stimuli and reward. 
Think, for example, of relationships between current stimuli and future rewards (Hills, 2006; 
Miller & Cohen, 2001). According to Miller and Cohen (2001) relationships are represented 
in the PFC by patterns of neuronal activity that include information about appropriate actions 
in a given situation. These patterns of activation can bias systems that are responsible for the 
execution of actions (Miller & Cohen, 2011). Moreover, these patterns of activation can be 
strengthened by neuromodulatory reinforcement signaling by, for example, DA (Miller & 
Cohen, 2001). Dopaminergic coding for reward prediction errors can then be used to relate 
stimuli to rewards in a representation in this correlative network through frontostriatal cortical 
loops (Cools, 2016; Hills, 2006; Maia & Frank, 2011; Schultz, 2016). Hills (2006) proposes 
that an increased dopaminergic hold on goal-related representations in search would cause a 
search of a more local neural assembly on the one hand. On the other hand, a decreased 
dopaminergic hold allows for a search of a larger neural assembly related to more global goal-
related representations. In other words, a decrease in dopaminergic hold allows for 
exploration of more possibly appropriate actions related to the goal while an increase relates 
to more exploitation of the most appropriate actions (Hills, 2006).  
Under the assumption that exploratory and exploitative behavior are analogous to 
flexible and persistent behavior, the positive relationship between DA and exploitative 
behavior can be observed in neurological and psychiatric disorders that have been related to 
aberrant dopaminergic processing (Hills, 2006; Jongkees & Colzato, 2016; Maia & Frank, 
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2011). For example, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder has been related to a 
hypodopaminergic state and many symptoms appear as an inability to persist in behavior 
(Krause, Dresel, Krause, La Fougere, & Ackenheil, 2003; Schinka, Letsch, & Crawford, 
2002). However, findings involving dopaminergic processing in pathologies have been 
inconsistent and it is difficult to judge the wide ranges of symptoms as a whole as overly 
flexible or peristent (Jongkees & Colzato, 2016; Maia & Frank, 2011).  
More problematic, ample evidence indicates that high DA is related to exploratory 
behavior, not exploitation (for a recent review see Jongkees & Colzato, 2016). Hills (2006) 
explains that in a highly uncertain situation the striatum might increase the dopaminergic hold 
on so many different representations of behaviors that are possibly related to rewards, that the 
hold on representations actually again allows for a more global cognitive search. Exploratory 
behavior might thus result from possible exploitation of many different representations kept in 
working memory in the PFC (Cools, 2015; Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008; Hills, 2006). 
Indeed, widespread neuronal activation in DA-modulated frontostriatal networks has been 
observed in case of high uncertainty or unfamiliarity (Hills, 2006). This explanation would 
suggest that striatal DA is related to cognitive flexibility in a U-shaped manner, where high 
and low striatal DA levels would be related to flexible or exploratory search and intermediate 
levels to more persistent or exploitative search.  
 
Differentiating between cognitive flexibility and performance flexibility. Some 
evidence seems to contradict the idea of a U-shaped relationship between the level of striatal 
DA and cognitive flexibility. For example, a study on divergent creativity found an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between DA levels and performance on a flexibility task (Akbari 
Chermahini & Hommel, 2012). Participants performed the Alternate Uses Task, which 
benefits from an ability to flexibly switch between ideas or high exploration of goal-related 
Running head: SEARCH IN DIFFERENT COGNITIVE DOMAINS AND DOPAMINE  8 
representations (Guilford, 1967). Those with high and low DA levels scored lower on 
flexibility than those with intermediate DA levels (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2012). 
These seemingly conflicting findings might be reconciled when we differentiate between the 
level of flexible switching between representations in the frontostriatal DA network (from 
here on ‘cognitive flexibility) and the level of performance in tasks that require flexible 
switching between ideas (from here on ‘performance flexibility’). A U-shaped relationship 
between DA and cognitive flexibility as suggested by Hills (2006) does not exclude an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between DA and performance flexibility as found by Akbari 
and Chermahini (2012). As discussed earlier, high cognitive flexibility can come from either a 
lack of a dopaminergic hold on any appropriate representation or a global dopaminergic hold 
on many different representations (Hills, 2006). Performance flexibility might suffer from a 
search that is too global due to high cognitive flexibility such that non-goal-related 
representations are considered in the search for an appropriate response (Hills, 2006; Jongkees 
& Colzato, 2016). Thus, at low and high levels of DA cognitive flexibility may be high and 
go together with low performance flexibility.  
 
Differentiating between dopaminergic exploratory and exploitative systems. 
Instead of two ends of one dimension ranging from flexibility to persistence, flexibility (or 
exploration) and persistence (or exploitation) can also be thought of as two different systems 
in cognitive control (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2012; Cools, 2015; Cools & D’Esposito, 
2011). This idea is supported by the observation that performance in divergent thinking tasks 
is not correlated to performance in convergent thinking tasks (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 
2012). Moreover, DA seems to be related to performance in the two types of tasks in different 
manners. Where DA level seemed to be related to performance on a divergent thinking task in 
an inverted-U shaped manner, DA might be linearly and negatively related to convergent 
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thinking, although this finding was not very reliable (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2012). 
Cools and D'Esposito (2011) propose that cognitive control is indeed dependent on two 
competing dopaminergic states. They propose a functional opponency between the PFC and 
the striatum. On the one hand, dopaminergic activation in the PFC promotes stability of 
representations, allowing for exploitation. On the other hand striatal dopaminergic activity 
promotes flexibility, allowing for exploration (Cools, 2015; Cools & D'Esposito, 2011). 
Intermediate levels of DA are then associated with a balance between the two systems that 
allows for adaptive cognitive control in terms of behaving in a flexible or persistent manner. 
Sub- or supraoptimal levels of DA in either system would be associated with decreased 
cognitive performance (Cools, 2015).  
Dual-state theory states that this balance depends on different types of DA activity in 
the PFC: D1- and D2 receptor-mediated (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008). With intermediate 
levels of DA the PFC assumes a D1 receptor-mediated state in which a high-energy barrier 
between representations precludes the switching between them and thus promotes the 
stabilization of representations. High or low levels of DA, on the other hand, are associated 
with a D2 receptor-mediated PFC state. The D2 receptor-mediated state involves a low-
energy barrier that promotes switching between representations and exploratory behavior 
(Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008). As there are predominantly D1 receptors in the PFC and D2 
receptors in the striatum the theories proposed by Cools and D'Esposito (2011) and 
Durstewitz and Seamans (2008) are compatible (Hommel, 2015).  
Hommel (2015) proposes the metacontrol state model (MSM) that generalizes these 
ideas and states that metacontrol depends on a balance between one state that promotes 
flexible cognitive control and another state that promotes focused or persistent cognitive 
control. He explains that the increased impact of a goal representation and/or a high 
competitiveness between different representations increase persistence. Flexible behavior, on 
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the other hand, should be related to a lesser impact of goal representation and/or low 
competitiveness between representations (Hommel, 2015).  
 
Eye blink rate and dopamine. In summary, DA likely has a role in control of 
exploratory and exploitative behavior, possibly in two different systems. The dopaminergic 
system that underlies simple search behavior like ARS might have evolved into the 
dopaminergic systems that now afford complex processing in cognitive search. Based on the 
theory on two different systems in cognitive control mentioned earlier, we might conclude the 
striatum to be implicated in the control of cognitive flexibility.  
One way of measuring DA levels is eye blink rate (EBR). This is an indirect measure 
of DA where higher EBR indicates a higher level of striatal DA (Jongkees & Colzato, 2016; 
Stevens, 1978). EBR has been used to study how differences in striatal DA are related to 
differences in reinforcement learning, cognitive control, cognitive flexibility, and working 
memory (Jongkees & Colzato, 2016). To our knowledge, EBR has not been used before to 
study how differences in striatal DA are related to differences in search behavior. In this study 
we assumed that the level of exploration in cognitive control in search might be related to or 
even the same as the level of flexibility in cognitive control. EBR as a measure of striatal DA 
then offers the opportunity to study the relationships between striatal DA and differences in 
exploratory behavior in cognitive search.  
 
The current study 
In this study we tried to replicate the studies on carry-over effects between different 
domains of search that were described earlier (Hills et al., 2008, 2010; Wilke, 2006; Wilke et 
al., 2004). Participants performed a cognitive word search task twice in which they had to 
search for anagrams from letter sets, the so-called scrabble task. In between the pretest and 
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posttest scrabble task they foraged a visual scene for food tokens, the visual foraging task. 
The food tokens in the visual scene were distributed either in a clustered or diffuse manner 
throughout the scene. We added EBR as a measure of DA levels to study the 
neuromodulatory effects of DA in human search behavior. As discussed above we expected to 
find a relationship between DA and exploratory search behavior.  
 
Hypotheses 
First, we expected to replicate the main findings of Hills et al. (2008, 2010). We 
expected that there would be carry-over effects of exploratory and exploitative search 
strategies between tasks: Those participants who would search for food tokens in a clustered 
environment should search within letter sets for longer in the scrabble posttest compared to 
the pretest. This would indicate less exploration between letter sets and more exploitation 
within letter sets. The other way around, participants in the diffuse condition should search for 
words within letter sets in the posttest for a shorter time compared to the pretest. This would 
indicate more exploration between letter sets and less exploitation within letter sets.  
Second, we expected that participants with different EBRs would show different 
search behavior in the scrabble tasks. We expected an inverted U-shaped relation between the 
time spent searching for words in a letter set and EBR such that those with low and high EBR 
stayed in the letter sets the shortest, showing higher exploratory behavior. This would be in 
line with Hills' (2006) expectation of more exploration for low and high DA levels and more 
exploitation for intermediate levels (Hills, 2006). We also expected participants with low and 
high DA levels to turn less immediately after finding food tokens, indicating higher 
exploratory behavior even in response to possible patches of reward. Again, this finding 
would offer evidence for the suggestion that cognitive flexibility is regulated by dopaminergic 
holds on representations in the striatum (Hills, 2006).  
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Method 
Participants  
Participants were sampled from an undergraduate psychology and child studies 
population at Leiden University. We visited lectures, approached students in the faculty 
hallways, and sampled via Facebook groups, posters in the faculty hallways, and a participant 
management system. We included 54 undergraduate participants with a mean age of 21.55 
years (SD = 6.54 years, 76% females) in this study. All participants were native Dutch 
speakers and in self-reported excellent physical and mental health. Participants with contact 
lenses were asked to wear their glasses during the tasks and take them off for the EBR 
measures. Those participants who smoked were asked to refrain from smoking before 
participating in our study. As EBR has been found to relate to arousal, and thus might vary 
over different times of day, all participants were tested between 9 AM and 5 PM (Chandler, 
Waterhouse, & Gao, 2014; Jongkees & Colzato, 2016). Informed consent was required for 
every participant and they received course credit for their participation. 
 
Procedure  
Participants were informed about the study and signed informed consent. They were 
then taken to a room where artificial lighting was kept constant over all participants and they 
were seated in front of a computer. Before they performed any tasks we measured their EBR. 
All participants then performed the scrabble pretest followed by the visual foraging task. 
After measuring their EBR for the second time they performed the scrabble posttest.  
 
Materials  
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Eye blink rate. EBR was measured twice during the experiment. Participants sat in 
front of the computer screen with a fixation cross on it and were asked to look at the cross in a 
relaxed state. We filmed them with a webcam for 6 minutes. Based on video images we 
counted the number of blinks in 6 minutes manually. We divided the total number of blinks 
by 6 to get a measure of their EBR per minute.  
 
Scrabble task. We replicated the scrabble task from the studies by Hills et al. as 
closely as possible (2008, 2010). This task was used to study internal, cognitive search 
behavior. Participants were asked to find as many anagrams as possible from a set of letters. 
For example, the letter set TNIERW contains among other words the Dutch words ‘winter’ 
(winter), ‘trein’ (train), and ‘niet’ (not). Each word had to be a Dutch word consisting of at 
least four letters and could not be plural or a proper name. Every letter in the set could be used 
only once. Participants could enter as many words as they wanted when a letterset was shown. 
Feedback was given about whether the word was correct immediately after entering the word. 
They could change to the next letterset whenever they wanted but the next set was shown only 
after a waiting penalty of 15 seconds to represent ‘travel costs’ between patches. A total of 18 
lettersets was created with a mean number of 15.2 valid words (SD = 4.9). Words were judged 
as correct words based on an online anagram dictionary (www.wordfeudhelp.nl) and every 
word was cross referenced with a Dutch dictionary for outdatedness and correct spelling. No 
additional correct words were found in the participants’ responses that were not in the original 
list of correct words. 
Participants were allowed to practice on one letter set before starting the scrabble 
pretest. In the pretest each participant was shown four consecutive lettersets (the same sets in 
the same order for each participant) from which they were asked to form words. In the 
posttest participants were told to find 30 words in total and to not spend too little or too much 
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time in each letter set. They had to form the words within the remaining 14 letter sets that 
were the same for each participant but presented in random order.  
 
Visual foraging task. The visual foraging task was used to study external search 
behavior (similar to Hills et al., 2010). Participants were presented with a 200 x 200 pixel 
blank field in which they could control a foraging icon using the ‘J’ to initiate a 35˚ 
counterclockwise turn and ‘L’ for a 35˚ clockwise turn. The foraging icon moved at a speed of 
approximately 20 pixels per second and participants practiced its controls for 30 seconds. 
Whenever the participant moved the foraging icon over a food pixel (‘food token’) the pixel 
would turn green and remain green for the rest of the trial. They could not see where they had 
been before neither where food pixels could be found. Participants were randomly assigned to 
either the clustered condition or the diffuse condition. In the clustered condition 3044 food 
pixels were distributed in four diamond-shaped patches. In the diffuse condition the food 
pixels were distributed over the blank field in 624 patches of five pixels each. Both the 
clustered and diffuse patches were distributed randomly over the visual scenes. 
The participants were told to search for as many food pixels as they could find in five 
different visual scenes. Each search lasted for two minutes. The participants were not told 
about the exact duration of each trial, but a sweeping hand clock in the top right corner was 
used to indicate that time was passing without an explicit report of how much time was left. 
We measured the turning angle immediately after finding food by counting the number of 
35˚-turns within 0.3 s after every encounter with food.  
 
Results 
All participants (N = 54) were randomly assigned to either the clustered (n = 27) or 
diffuse (n = 27) condition. Upon initial data inspection we found that one participant did not 
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finish the task properly but instead stopped searching for words in the posttest and skipped the 
final six letter sets before finding 30 words. A second participant spent longer than 3 or more 
standard deviations above the mean (M = 82.57 s, SD= 46.49 s) in all but the last letter set to 
search for words in the scrabble posttest. A third participant failed to meet the 30-word 
criterion in the scrabble posttest within 14 letter sets and used dextroamphetamine on a 
regular basis, which affects DA levels and EBR (Strakowski & Sax, 1998). All three 
participants were removed from the data before analysis. After exclusion of these three 
participants, 26 participants remained in the clustered condition and 25 in the diffuse 
condition.  
Due to technical issues we could not use the videos of the first 12 participants to 
measure their EBR and their data was excluded from the analyses of the second hypothesis. 
However, we did include data of these participants in the analyses of those hypotheses for 
which all necessary values were available. Wherever we report medians instead of means the 
data were not distributed normally and nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum tests were used to 
test for differences between medians.  
 
Carry-over effects between visual search and cognitive search 
The clustered (Mdn = 67.75 s) and diffuse (Mdn = 76.02 s) groups spent the same 
amount of time in each letter set in the scrabble pretest (z = -0.45, p = .651), indicating no 
difference in cognitive search behavior between the two conditions before the visual foraging 
task. The combined median time spent in letter sets in the pretest was 74.77 s. The groups 
found different amounts of food tokens in the visual foraging task. Participants from the 
clustered condition (Mdn = 740.2 tokens) found more tokens than participants in the diffuse 
condition, Mdn = 134.2 tokens, z = 5.32, p < .001. Because of this difference we corrected the 
turning angle after food for the amount of food tokens that were encountered, effectively 
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calculating the mean turning angle after food per encountered food token. We used this 
measure as a manipulation check to see if our participants were sensitive to the spatial layout 
of the foraging scenes in the visual foraging task. We expected that the participants in the 
clustered condition would respond to food tokens by turning—to exploit the patch the tokens 
were in—more than participants in the diffuse condition (as found by Hills et al., 2010). 
Contrary to our expectations, we found that the clustered group had a smaller turning angle 
after encountering food (Mdn = 7.11˚) than the diffuse group, Mdn = 12.75˚, z = -4.42, p < 
.001. Participants in the clustered condition thus turned less in response to food compared to 
the participants in the diffuse condition and behaved thus less exploitative according to Hills 
et al.’s reasoning (2008, 2010).  
Our first hypothesis was that participants’ search behavior would be primed by the 
visual foraging task like Hills et al. (2008, 2010) found. Similar to these studies, we used the 
difference in time spent in letter sets between the pre- and posttest to test this hypothesis. 
Participants usually stayed in the final set in the posttest for a shorter time, as the task finished 
when they found their 30th word, therefore we used the difference between their median time 
in letter sets in the pre- and posttest as their central tendency. On average, participants in the 
clustered condition spent 6.51 s longer in the scrabble posttest than in the pretest, while 
participants in the diffuse condition spent 19.76 s longer in the posttest, t(46.66) = -2.06, p = 
.045 (Figure 1). Again, this was not what we expected based on the study by Hills et al. (2008, 
2010). In our study, participants who foraged a clustered visual scene increased their search 
time per letter set less than participants who foraged a diffuse visual scene. In other words, it 
seems as if participants in the diffuse condition showed more exploitative behavior than those 
in the clustered condition after searching the diffuse scene in the visual foraging task.   
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Eye Blink Rate, Exploration, and Exploitation 
For our second hypothesis, we expected that EBR would be related in an inverse-U 
shaped manner to exploitation. Participants with low and high EBR should then stay shorter in 
each letterset, making exploratory moves between letter sets, than participants with 
intermediate EBR, who would exploit more within letter sets. We tested this hypothesis with 
mean time spent in a letter set in the scrabble pretest (as a measure of trait exploratory 
behavior) and their initial EBR measurement (a measure of trait EBR). Other than expected, 
there was no quadratic relationship between EBR and the time spent in a letter set in the 
pretest, F(2,36) = 0.11, p = .892, R2 = 0.01.  
We also tested whether there was an inverted U-shaped quadratic relationship between 
EBR and turning angle after food. Here a low or high EBR should be related to smaller 
turning angle or exploratory behavior, while intermediate EBR should be related to a larger 
turning angle after food or exploitative behavior. Because the difference in turning angle after 
Figure 1 The mean difference in seconds between the stay in 
the pretest and posttest letter sets for the clustered and diffuse 
group. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. * p < .05. 
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finding food between the clustered and diffuse group was significant as mentioned earlier, the 
regression analysis was performed for each group separately. Again, no quadratic relationship 
was found between EBR and turning angle immediately after encountering food tokens in the 
clustered group (F(2,17) = 0.56, p = .58, R2 = 0.06) or in the diffuse group, F(2,15) = 0.61, p 
= .56, R2 = 0.07.  
 
Discussion 
We set out to replicate findings that showed that exploratory or exploitative search 
strategies could carry-over between search tasks in different domains of search (i.e., visual 
search and cognitive search; Hills et al., 2008, 2010). We predicted that participants who 
foraged a visual scene with clustered food tokens would show ARS-like behavior: They 
should exploit these clusters by turning immediately after finding food (Kalff et al., 2010; 
Hills, 2006; Hills et al., 2008, 2010). On the other hand we expected those who foraged a 
scene with diffusely spread out food tokens to explore more or turn less in response to food. 
This should then prime exploitation and exploration, respectively, in a subsequent cognitive 
search task: the scrabble task. However, we found a different effect, already starting in the 
visual foraging task. Participants in the diffuse condition turned more after encountering food 
compared to those in the clustered condition, showing more ARS-like behavior than 
participants in the clustered condition. This difference between the clustered and the diffuse 
group still existed in the scrabble posttest. Compared to the pretest, the diffuse group 
increased the time they spent in a letter set more than the clustered group did. These findings 
suggest that there are priming effects of a visual search task on a cognitive search task as 
more exploitative behavior in the diffuse group carried over from the visual foraging task to 
the scrabble posttest. However, the question remains why our diffuse group showed more 
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exploitative behavior in search than the clustered group, contrary to what Hills et al. found 
(2008, 2010).  
To our knowledge the only difference between this study and the studies by Hills et al. 
(2008, 2010) were the added measures of EBR. We measured EBR before the scrabble pretest 
and again between the visual foraging task and the scrabble posttest to study the influence of 
differences in striatal DA levels on search behavior. During the EBR measurement 
participants focused on a fixation cross for six minutes, which might have acted as a form of 
focused attention meditation. This is a form of meditation in which the practitioner 
concentrates attention on one object, such as their breathing (Lippelt, Hommel, & Colzato, 
2014; Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008). Another type of meditation is open 
monitoring meditation, in which the practitioner tries to reach an open monitoring awareness, 
without focus on anything specific (Lippelt et al., 2014; Lutz et al., 2008). Where open 
monitoring meditation can induce a more flexible or exploratory cognitive style (e.g., Colzato, 
Sellaro, Samara, Baas, & Hommel, 2015; Colzato, Sellaro, Samara, & Hommel, 2015), 
focused attention meditation is thought to increase a persistent or exploitative cognitive style 
(Hommel, 2015). For example, it has been related to a narrowed attentional focus (e.g., 
Colzato, Sellaro, Samara, Baas, & Hommel, 2015), increased cognitive persistence (e.g., 
Colzato, Van der Wel, & Sellaro, 2016), and increased cognitive control (e.g., Colzato, 
Sellaro, Samara, & Hommel, 2015). If the EBR measurements acted as a form of focused 
meditation, this might have induced an exploitative cognitive style in both groups. However, 
this would only explain why the diffuse group did not decrease their time spent in a letter set 
in the scrabble posttest, not why they increased their time spent in a letter set more than the 
clustered group.  
One explanation might be that the induced exploitative cognitive style and the nature 
of the diffuse visual foraging task interacted to increase the exploitative cognitive style in the 
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scrabble posttest. The food tokens in the diffuse search fields were distributed in small 
patches of five pixels and the EBR measurement might have primed participants to consider 
the diffuse condition to consist of many small patches of food tokens. Indeed, some 
participants spontaneously mentioned the challenge they saw in completing the small patches 
of food tokens. Exploiting these small patches would require larger turning angles than 
exploiting patches in the clustered condition. Exploiting patches in the diffuse search fields 
could thus have induced a very focused, exploitative cognitive style which carried over to the 
scrabble task.  
Exploitation of the small patches in the diffuse condition might also have increased the 
difficulty of the visual foraging task. Participants had to turn more vigorously and had to 
exploit more patches to find as many food tokens as possible. Increased difficulty can cause 
an increase in effort and this might have caused participants in the diffuse condition to be 
more persistent in their exploitative search than those in the clustered condition (Brehm & 
Self, 1989; Higgins, 2006; Klinger, 1975).  
We interpreted the larger turning angle after finding food in the diffuse group as an 
indication of more exploitative behavior, however, it could be interpreted differently. The 
turning angle was measured by adding up all turns (each with an angle of 35˚) within 0.3 s 
after finding food. A larger cumulative turning angle does then not necessarily indicate that a 
participant turned around to go back and exploit an encountered patch. Another possibility is 
that the participants in the diffuse condition performed a more frantic, exploratory search, in 
which they turned more but in different consecutive directions. Unfortunately, we did not 
record the search paths that our participants used, and can thus only speculate about the 
diffuse group having turned more because they tried to exploit the small patches of food 
tokens. However, a frantic exploratory style would also relate to very fast switches between 
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letter sets in the scrabble posttest and still cause the diffuse group to decrease their stay in 
letter sets compared to their scrabble pretest.  
According to our second hypothesis we expected an inverse-U shaped relationship 
between the time spent searching for words in a letter set and EBR. This would have 
suggested that those participants with high and low striatal DA would show the highest 
exploratory behavior. However, there was no difference in the time spent in letter sets 
between participants with high or low and intermediate EBR. This can be explained if we 
assume two different dopaminergic systems to control cognitive style as discussed before, one 
for control of flexibility and one for persistence (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Durstewitz & 
Seamans, 2008; Hommel, 2015). EBR as a measure of striatal DA, in contrast to prefrontal 
DA, has been related more often to cognitive flexibility and exploration than to cognitive 
persistence and exploitation (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Frank et al., 2009; Jongkees & 
Colzato, 2016). Moreover, the findings by Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2012) suggested 
that convergent thinking and EBR were unreliably related if related at all. If all participants 
were indeed primed to a more exploitative cognitive style, EBR may not the correct measure 
of individual differences in DA. Rather, it would be interesting to consider differences in 
prefrontal DA levels to study differences in cognitive persistence or exploitation, for example 
by measuring the COMT genotype (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005). 
 
Limitations 
The most obvious limitation in this study is the possible interference of the EBR 
measurement with the replication of the results by Hills et al. (2008, 2010). Although the 
effects the EBR measurement may have had as a form of focused meditation might have led 
to some interesting results, it was not our intention to use EBR as such. Future studies that 
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would like to include EBR as a measurement to study striatal DA effects in cognitive control 
must consider measuring baseline EBR in a separate session.  
Another limitation is the homogeneity of the sample. Although we did not register 
participant characteristics such as ethnic background, social economic status, or religion, 
undergraduate student samples are quite homogenous (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). 
This might affect the range of exploratory and exploitative search behavior as cultural 
differences influence cognitive control styles (Hommel, 2015). For example, people from 
Western cultures employ a more analytic cognitive style compared to people from Eastern 
cultures, whose reasoning is more holistic (e.g., Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005). However, Hills 
et al. (2010) also used an undergraduate participant sample in the studies we were aiming to 
replicate. The homogeneity of the sample may thus preclude generalization of results to a 
wider population but should not have precluded the replication of Hills et al.’s earlier 
findings.  
Finally, we measured EBR by visual inspection of video, which leaves the possibility 
of human error. However, when videos were hard to judge (e.g., because someone blinked 
very often or had many partial blinks) videos were watched at a slower speed or frame-by-
frame.  
 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, we aimed to replicate the findings of Hills et al. (2008, 2010) and 
supplement these findings with an indirect measure of striatal DA to be able to study the 
dopaminergic mechanisms in cognitive search. The inclusion of EBR in this study seems to 
have changed the nature of the study to such an extent that we were not able to replicate Hills 
et al. (2008, 2010). However, our findings are interesting as they do still suggest that 
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cognitive control styles in search can be induced, for example by meditation, and that effects 
carry over between tasks. We also found that striatal DA was not related to search behavior in 
either visual search or cognitive search as predicted, which might relate to different 
dopaminergic systems in exploitative versus exploratory cognitive control. It appears that 
studying the role of DA in search behavior might require measures of prefrontal DA as well.  
To conclude, different dopaminergic systems should be considered in the study of 
human search behavior and studies of carry-over effects of cognitive styles in search should 
be designed very carefully. Nevertheless, the study of foraging and search behavior can 
increase our knowledge on cognitive control and perhaps offer different interesting methods 
and models.  
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